MiddleMedia

Timeline, needing interactivity

2010-04-12T02:51:00.001-07:00

Critical Discourse Analysis

2009-11-29T09:17:00.001-08:00

1- Reuters

2- Bloomberg(a)

3- Bloomberg(b)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLecp8ecTfM

4- CBS

5- CNN

http://us.cnn.com/video/?/video/business/2009/11/27/neill.dubai.atlantis.turmoil.cnn

6- Al-Jazeera English

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAg4pHDeXjA

7- Russia Today

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cSWSwhn-AWc

8- MSNBC

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

9- Voice of America News

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDJJKqG9hec

Mediated Elections - Lebanon

2009-06-14T09:40:00.000-07:00

Lebanon's election: a slideshow from opendemocracy on Vimeo.

Video courtesy of OpenDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/lebanon-elections-slideshow-2009)

Why do we tweet? (ie use Twitter)

2009-04-20T00:06:00.000-07:00

Well according to this NYT article, Virginia Heffman reports that Bruce Sterling suggests it's because we're poor. "Only the poor — defined broadly as those without better options — are obsessed with their connections. Anyone with a strong soul or a fat wallet turns his ringer off for good and cultivates private gardens that keep the hectic Web far away. The man of leisure, Sterling suggested, savors solitude, or intimacy with friends, presumably surrounded by books and film and paintings and wine and vinyl — original things that stay where they are and cannot be copied and corrupted and shot around the globe with a few clicks of a keyboard."
Heffman questions the constant tallying of friends on Facebook. Are we substituting our official lack of wealth with a wealth of friends, who as Heffman points out are more liabilities than assets? What are 586 friends? How many of those can be counted on in an emergency situation?
-to be continued-

Ghost-in-the-shell-induced musing

2009-04-19T23:21:00.000-07:00

The Ghost in the Shell films based on the manga created by Masamune Shirow, is a futurist police thriller centered around the exploits of covert security forces unit Section 9. The events which occur circa 2030 revolve around "Major" Kusanagi, Batou and a few other members of the division, who are part cyborg, to varying degrees. The Major in particular has only parts of her brain, and a segment of her spinal chord which are still organic (real). The films and subsequent series have all dealt with the dilemnas of the characters as they try to figure out their exact nature. What is real? What makes a person real? Where does the essence of a human being reside? What happens to a mind without a body? Can the identity/individuality be maintained whole if only alive in the network? If we consider Marshall McLuhan's view of media as an extension of man, this movie (and the subsequent sequels and series) offer an interesting illustration of the the current modern world, where our increased connectivity renders us practically cyborg. The networking/information distribution is the key component of Ghost in the Shell, along with the issues of identity/individuality. The ultimate power is wielded by the Hacker, not the military. Who is now in control? The army on the ground? Or the people who control satellites and can scan/document/distribute information from a secure location, not necessarily anywhere the ground in question? The concept of "stealing" is also redefined. When previously, a theft took an object from one place to another, a hole was created, something would be missing. It would be easier to spot, and easier to find. The stealing of data/information/identity in modern times is interestingly never "stealing". The information does not disappear. Instead of an absence of information, there is a multiplication of information. (Brings back Benjamin's copy vs original to mind, but we're also beyond mechanical reproduction). The nature of that theft makes it harder to spot. How do you find stolen information, when everything remains in place? The focus then shifts from content to control, and access again.

This is the world according to a Chuck Norris movie.

2009-04-07T17:22:00.000-07:00

That's what a NYT article called the world of 24. Watching Jack Bauer perform his always-world-saving stunts for the past 7 seasons has been fun. Who doesn't love a tough guy? Action? And happy endings? The series which debuted after 9/11, capitalized on the buzzword of the time: Terrorism. Indeed, Jack Bauer was head of a government agency called CTU, short for Counter Terrorism Unit. Oddly CTU headquarters were located in Los Angeles, which I suppose was one way of separating it from the more rigid CIA and FBI agencies. As the same NYT article whose words I take my title from posits, this last season (the seventh) which starts off in Africa, then moves to DC - a more logical target of terrorist activity. Throughout its 6 seasons, Jack Bauer, CTU, California and America have fought off threats which emanated from various terrorist countries. Some of the appeal of 24 may have to do with its "progressive" thinking: It has so far had 2 African American presidents (brothers David and Wayne Palmer, with as much charm as the Kennedys) and now in its last season has broken new grounds with a woman occupying the White House. Now that Obama is president, the Palmers are even more believable in retrospect. Will Hillary be next? (Heroes another popular television series now in its 3rd season has followed suite with a black president.) I remember fearing for Obama's life, wondering if he had not watched 24...

The show's premise is that it works in real time. 24 are the number of hours in a day, and each episode of the season represents one hour of that day. Apparently, all plots can be subverted in less than 24 hours, criminals can be found out within 2 hours, even if apprehending them (or killing them) takes longer. So real time. Real time placing it in a more "real" experience.
But of course some things are not real: Integrated software and networks that can access any and all cameras world-wide, connections to satellite links and incredible upload/download speeds, and the fact that there is always a mole at CTU (one would think a government agency would have a better screening process). And Jack says: secure the perimeter, he's gone dark, trust me on this one (not unlike the Bush administration, I might add. WMD in Iraq, links to Al Qaeda - trust us on this one!).

Out of the 6 seasons, 3 included threats from Arab or Muslim countries, often abetted by terrorists from other parts of the world. [The other seasons included terrorists from Yugoslavia, Mexico, Russia, China and [evil] American corporations.] This has not stopped the show from being successful in the Middle East. A few friends, my brother and I are total Jack Bauer fans. We watch each episode en groupe, cheering and jumping around and hissing and booing as if we were watching a soccer game. It's fun. I even bought a fliptop phone (after my older one died) because everybody on 24 had a fliptop phone. My phone ring is the CTU phone ring. Pathetic, yes. But not quite. Part of the fun in watching 24 is not (just) the action, as much as it is the active commentary on our part about what is shown on screen.

For one thing, a lot of the Arabs characters portrayed on the show are not played by Arabs. This makes for hilarious moments of 'almost Arabic' dialogue. Most of the non-Arab actors don't know what they are saying although they know the gist of it. They don't know which word holds more meaning. Often they stress the wrong word or wrong syllable. A favorite scene: Kal Penn in season 5, yelling at his American friend about the correct way to pronounce his name: My name is not Aaah-mad, he shouts, my name is Akhmed! Except he doesn't pronounce it right either. It's not Akhmed, it's Ahmed. And we laugh.

However, the producers and casting directors have tried to get more Arab actors performing smaller parts: There have been more scenes with real Arabs, except again here the problem is in the accents. Brothers and cousins have accents that are as different as day from night. Of course, we Arabs can discern them. It's not quite as funny as the language schizophrenia of Syriana, Rendition and Body of Lies (and Leonardo diCaprio does a better job than Clooney in Arabic, Clooney was actually unintelligible), where citizens don't seem to speak the language of the country. [sidenote: imagine a film that starts out with a visual of the map of the USA, it then zooms in on Texas, and everybody there speaks Australian English, Cockney, Jamaican English, haughty aristocratic English, anything but the typical southern drawl... but I digress]

So brothers in jail, or citizens of the same country speak differently.
Furthermore, plots are hatched by Ali and Omar together. What are the odds of that? Ali conspiring with Omar? Ali is a typical Shiite name, while Omar is a typical Sunni name. Rarely are they observed in families of the opposite sect. It's unlikely that Ali and Omar be on the same side politically. Even when they are fighting "a same enemy", they would not enlist someone from the other sect. So Ali and Omar, says the agent, are hiding in a basement somewhere. And we laugh. In one season, the White House kept identifying the threat as coming from "three Middle Eastern countries". The map on the screen in the White House showed the coast of Bermuda for all I could tell, it definitely did not show the Mediterranean or the Gulf. Back then, my brother and I enjoyed the challenge of figuring out which 3 countries the scriptwriters were hinting to. Did they include Turkey? Israel? Why had they not said "Arab" countries? Another season alluded more directly to Saudi Arabia. It was an oil-rich monarchy, with strong terrorist activity (remember the majority of 9/11 attackers were Saudi). There was a prince who wanted peace, who had turned away from terrorism, and he had clout enough to convince terrorists to abort their mission. Of course, he was the educated-in-Britain soft spoken Western friendly prince. He was killed. We laugh. We joke that we would like to have Jack Bauer handle the assassination of Lebanese ex-prime minister Rafik el Hariri. It would have been over within 24 hours instead of the International Tribunal Hearing, which will probably drag on for years.

Criticism of the show's depiction of Muslims began in its fourth season, in which the main antagonists were Muslims affiliated with the fictional terrorist group Turkish Crimson Jihad. In the first episode, a Muslim-American family is depicted to be among these, in which parents and their teenage son actively engage in a plot to kill Americans (although the son, and in later episodes, the mother, are portrayed sympathetically). Criticism began early on in the season, including a complaint made by the Council on American-Islamic Relations that depicting Muslims as terrorists could "contribute to an atmosphere that it’s OK to harm and discriminate against Muslims. This could actually hurt real-life people." Following this complaint, representatives from the Council and FOX met to discuss the matter, and an episode of the season began with a public service announcement by Kiefer Sutherland addressing these concerns, in which he stated that "the American Muslim community stands firmly beside their fellow Americans in denouncing and resisting all forms of terrorism. So in watching ‘24,' please bear that in mind.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_reaction_to_24_(TV_series)

Is that criticism the reason why scriptwriters of 24 decided to base the plot of 24 Redemption (the 24 two hour trailer to season 7) in the fictitious African country of Sangala? Why would they feel the need to create a new country? Whose pressure stopped them from saying Congo, or Uganda, or (closer to the narrative) Rwanda? Why if we work in real-time, do we not have real-world countries? After we've managed to suspend disbelief for so long, we are now asked to move away from the (un)real world to a completely fictitious one. What a disappointment.

Of course my take on it is if Senegal+Angola=Sangala, then General Juma is modeled after Zuma (or at least his name is), who might soon become South Africa's new president, after corruption charges involving weapons deals were dropped. I just wonder how many people get their information from television these days. If Palin thinks Africa is a country, then why should not Sangala be a real one too? And apparently, 24 is vice-president Biden's favorite show, which is slightly worrisome, but might explain why he went and said the following during the vice-presidential debate with Palin: When we kicked -- along with France, we kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon, I said and Barack said, "Move NATO forces in there. Fill the vacuum, because if you don't know -- if you don't, Hezbollah will control it." When was Hezbollah ever kicked out of Lebanon? Probably in some Chuck Norris movie.

Reality TV Shows in the Arab World - Brief Overview

2009-03-27T10:07:00.000-07:00

With the development of transnational satellite television in the Arab world over the course of the previous decade, satellite channels have realized the need to provide their audience with entertainment program that can cater to all viewers from the Maghreb to the Mashreq. In this endeavor, regional reality television shows dedicated to the Arab market have encountered great success. Many satellite channels are now offering reality shows that are either adapted from existing European or American models, or created to cater more specifically to Arab audiences. Recently viewers in the Arab world have avidly followed Superstar (a version of American Idol), Star Academy (based on the successful French program of the same name), The Apprentice, Project Fashion (based on Project Runway), Al Hawa Sawa (Being - Live –Together, a matrimonial project show), as well as a short lived stint of Big Brother (a program similar to Survivor) to cite but a few. These reality shows have been very successful among the viewers if statistics are to be believed, but they have not been universally accepted. Indeed, the boom of reality television has been accompanied by much commentary acknowledging the fact that these new format shows have had phenomenal impact on the audience, and the responses to them have varied from the very critical to the optimistic and supportive. The fact is that these reality shows that are meant to cater to Arabs as a whole tend to reflect the differences and gaps between various Arab countries and cultures, despite the Pan-Arab flavor that producers try to instill in them. This paper will review the main responses of the Arab world to these reality shows, with a specific focus on its two most successful examples, which are Lebanese satellite channel Future TV’s Superstar, and Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation’s Star Academy, which have been airing since 2003, with no sign of abating success.

Music Based Reality Shows

Superstar and Star Academy, which were launched Lebanon-based Future TV and LBC respectively, have been by far the most successful of reality shows in the Arab world. Both shows are competitions where young Arab men and women from all corners of the Arab world, compete for the title of best singer/performer, with an album deal and regional tours being part of the prize. This idea is very enticing to the youth: the Arab music industry is a booming one, with stars the like of Lebanese singer Nancy Ajram earning millions in CD sales, private performances and brand sponsorships, at the tender age of 25. Other successful performers, such as Lebanese femme fatale Haifa Wehbe also receive high earnings despite the obvious lack of talent or voice. In a region plagued by unemployment, the idea of conquering the music scene and making (relatively) quick and easy money is one that caught the fancy of many young men and women. When Superstar and Star Academy first launched their casting calls, they received thousands of applications from around the Arab world.

Superstar is modeled after UK Pop Idol and US American Idol. Unlike them, but much like all reality TV shows in the Arab world, the contestants are chosen from different Arab countries, with auditions taking place in many Arab capitals, namely Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Tunis, and in the Emirate of Dubai. After the first season’s resounding success, audition cities increased in number, adding new Arab destinations and even non-Arab cities with large Arab Diaspora communities . Subsequent seasons included auditions in Paris, Sydney, Montreal, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Superstar follows the pattern of American Idol: a first round of episodes shows the auditions, with many comic scenes as not quite talented hopefuls try out in front of three judges, Elias Rahbani, a prominent Lebanese composer, and two or three other judges, depending on the season. All of the judges are renowned experts from the music field. The competition starts with a certain number of contestants, who, as the show progresses, are eliminated not only by the judges but also by the viewing public whose votes can influence the final selection. Votes can be placed either online or by placing calls to special numbers assigned to the contestants, during the airing of each weekly episode and the week following it.
LBC’s Star Academy is modeled after the French program of the same name. In this show, 16 finalists called “students” of the “Academy” are share living quarters, in what is effectively a kind of boarding school for the performing arts. The eight young women and eight young men take singing, dancing, and acting classes, as well as any other classes that might enhance their stage performance and presence. They were taught about the virtues of good diets, and had morning exercise classes they had to attend, because physical appearance is important for life in the limelight. They were regularly reprimanded for late attendance or absence. Star Academy’s full reality TV format meant that the students were filmed all day, while they cooked, did minor chores, rehearsed, argued or simply hung around the house. LBC launched a new station Nagham (meaning Melody), which broadcast the students’ tribulations 24 hours a day, with cameras even sending feeds from their separate sleeping quarters at night. The show aired one-hour episodes daily, with a prime time 2-hour gala performance and elimination on Fridays, on both the LBC terrestrial and satellite channels during the 4 months of the competition.
Star Academy and Superstar were first broadcasted during a period of particular tension in the Middle East. (Kraidy, 2007). An escalation in tension in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the beginning of the American led war on Iraq, a deterioration of the relations between Lebanon and Syria, among others were the contextual setting for the shows. Satellite television was abuzz with stories of conflict and war. Arab youth were tired of political programming, which they felt was depressing on one hand, and not necessarily related to their needs and desires (Karam, 2007). The two shows, which were specifically targeted to them, offered a welcome diversion from the dreariness of newscasts. Music, competition, and fashionable trendy performers attracted their attention directly. They were also already familiar with the original Western versions of the show, and were happy to see an Arab version developed, where popular and familiar songs were performed. Superstar, which was the first to be launched, was an immediate success. It quickly gained popularity among both the young and the old. The finale of the first season is reported to have been followed by 30 million viewers, and to have garnered four million votes from all over the Arab world on that night alone. Star Academy, which soon followed managed to eclipse Superstar. LBC had pulled all the stops to create a television extravaganza. The ability to follow the “students” throughout the week, with daily shows, and throughout the day on Nagham proved to very appealing to viewers. A ticker tape running at the bottom of the screen on Nagham TV (as well as on other competitor music channels) was proof of the tremendous success of the enterprise, with people sending messages to their favorite contestants daily. It is reported Star Academy on prime night captured the senses of 80% of the Lebanese public, and almost 40% of Saudi viewers.

Entertainment and Politics

Although the shows aspired to be unifying factors in the Arab world, bringing together people from different countries and diverse backgrounds, the truth of the matter was that they managed to expose as much separation as unification. Under the Pan-Arab mantle that they cloaked themselves with, indeed the contestants of both shows strived to become the new “Arab World Star”, competition between the contestants became a symbolic contest between the countries that they represent. The voting of the public as well reflected political and national alliances as opposed to voting for actual talent and skill.
Superstar was a “ political barometer” for “Lebanese-Syrian relations” (Kraidy, 2006).
In its first season in 2003, when Lebanese contestant Melhem Zein was eliminated in favor of the Syrian contestant Rowayda Attiyeh rising to the final round, riots erupted in Beirut. At the time, political tension was strong in Lebanon, with Syrian control evident politically and economically. Syrian intelligence had effectively put in place their own security apparatus in Lebanon, where the competition was taking place. Rumors circulated at that time that Syrian intelligence had even effected this most trivial elimination. Two years later, in 2005 Prime Minister Hariri (who happens to own Future TV, producer of Superstar) was assassinated and popular belief saw Syrian involvement in the matter. The Syrian troops and other intelligence officers withdrew from the country soon afterwards. That year, Syrian contestant Shahd Barmada reached the finale. Kraidy notes:
As Barmada walked to the front of the stage in a long shimmering beige dress to perform a song by Warda al-Jaza’iriyya, the camera zooms into a medium shot showing Barmada from the belt up. Suddenly, the screen is obscured by the back of a man whose graying hair betrayed his age. As he moves away, the man who turns out to be Barmada’s father reveals a large Syrian flag which he had just wrapped around his daughter’s shoulders. With a forced smile following a brief moment of what seems to be intense unease, Barmada removes the flag and throws it on her left shoulder, without interrupting her stunning rendition of Warda’s song. The young woman who has spared no effort in portraying her participation as a personal, artistic achievement unrelated to politics had found her body hijacked by patriotism. Getting rid of the flag was an untenable proposition; so putting it on one shoulder was the next best option.

That night Barmada lost to the Saudi contestant, but the press in Syria was abuzz with questions about how fair the treatment of Barmada had been. Did she not win because she was Syrian? Did the Saudi contestant win because of the well-known links between Saudi Arabia and the Hariri family? Although it’s not unnatural for people to vote for the citizens of their countries, reactions to Superstar went beyond the patriotic and into the specifically political. This was also directly visible in the direct aftermath of Hariri’s assassination on Star Academy, where 10 days of mourning were observed and the first episode following the incident had all the “students” singing patriotic songs, and the Syrian contestant being immediately voted out by the public. The shows also provided the public with a vocabulary that they could use in political protests. (Kraidy, 2006). In the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination, demonstrations erupted in Beirut demanding the resignation of both the government and then president Lahoud, as well as the withdrawal of Syrian troops. One banner used held the picture of Lahoud with “nominee” and “call 1559” written under it, in the same way that contestants are advertised on TV and in print. However, it also alluded to the fact that Lahoud was generally perceived as a Syrian pawn, and was nominated instead of being elected president, and 1559 is a reference to UN resolution 1559 calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territories.

One interesting reaction to Superstar and Star Academy was not quite political, but had to do with the politics of democracy. Many sociologists and people in academic circles insisted that one factors in the success of these shows was that young viewers were given the chance to vote. Most Arab countries are not democratic, and if they are, the youth still have no chance of being heard let alone making a difference. Superstar and Star Academy gave the youth direct influence on the selection process and the results were close. Some contestants lost by a mere 5% of votes, something Arab youth is largely unfamiliar with in the real democratic process, after all most presidents are (re-) elected with 99% of the votes. What is usually considered a “low-culture” pop product in most western countries was highly acclaimed in the Arab world as giving people a chance to experience a real voting process, and creating a new “public sphere” for traditionally passive audiences? The interlinked format of TV, text message, phone and Internet voting, allowed people to express opinions that were hardly ever heard, even if the opinions were only linked to music.

Social and Cultural differences

Star Academy, the more popular of the shows, received more negative criticism than its counterpart. Indeed many accusations were leveled against it, because of its “reality TV” format. The “students” of the Academy shared living quarters. While this is not a frequently observed phenomenon in Lebanon where the show is produced, it is not frowned upon either, and taken in stride as part of the premise of the show. Lebanon is widely perceived as the most Westernized country in the Middle East. More accurately, Lebanon perceives itself as such. Its constitution states that it is a country with an “Arab face”, thus falling short of officially declaring itself an Arab state. “Arab” is perceived to mean exclusively Muslim, while Lebanon prides itself on being multi-confessional (the constitution requires that the president be Christian Maronite, the prime minister Sunni Moslem and the head of Parliament Shiite Moslem thus ensuring the balance of political powers of various sects within the country). Lebanese satellite channels are known for having scantily and ornately dressed female presenters, and Star Academy hosts and “teachers” in particular spoke a mélange of Lebanese Arabic, and French which not all contestants understood. The Lebanese public is generally bilingual, speaking either French or English, but French specifically is the language of the elite, and is a throw back to the times of the French mandate. By using French liberally, the Lebanese tended to assert a cultural superiority on the other contestants. (Khatib). The producers probably received a lot of comments, because the contestants, teachers and hosts were later asked to stick to Arabic, whatever dialect of it they speak. This was not always a successful move, as dialects from the Maghreb (Tunisian and Moroccan) were not easily comprehended by contestants from the Levant or the Gulf, and vice-versa.

The success of Star Academy greatly worried more conservative countries. Saudi Arabia where viewership is reported to have been as high as 40% witnessed an uproar. Saudi clerics denounced the program as adopting Western codes of conduct and behavior, which are essentially incompatible with their particularly conservative Wahabi values. The idea of total strangers of both sexes sharing living quarters, in which the women were not decently covered from head to toe, was deemed highly immoral “haram”. One cleric went so far as calling the show “a whorehouse”. Indeed a fatwa (a formal religious edict) was issued, urging people to abstain from watching the show or participating in the voting process, warning them that it is the “Academy of the Devil” (Kraidy, 2006). Interestingly, the fatwa not only addressed audiences, but businessmen as well. Indeed, it asked them to stop funding and sponsoring Star Academy and other similar nefarious shows. As a consequence, Saudi’s telecom provider STC actually did ban calls from being made to vote for candidates, although the measure was useless, as Internet voting was still possible. But the call to business men reflected deep understanding of the financial workings of network televisions, as Star Academy’s channel LBC has shares owned by Saudi Prince Walid Bin Talal. As such the clerics were directly exhorting ruling family to obey Islamic Law. Tapes condemning the show and castigating the viewers, made by clerics during sermons quickly inundated the Saudi market. Websites mushroomed denouncing the show as un-Islamic. Another charge was directed against Superstar and Star Academy, whereby these shows gave women too much power, (when female contestant were victorious in elimination rounds against men). Ironically, they condemned the show not for portraying women as “sexual objects”, but as “agents” wielding power.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not the only Arab country to voice displeasure at the shows. Algeria found the show to be an immoral Western import and stopped broadcasting it on the state-run channel. It was however, still available on satellite. In Kuwait, a fatwa condemned Star Academy in the wake of a performance by its artists in Kuwait city. The ensuing controversy led to the minister of Information losing job.

Other reality TV shows

The controversy surrounding Star Academy and Superstar did not cause the discontinuation of the programs. However, other programs did not fare as well. Big Brother, which was set in Bahrain, was canceled after it had been on the air for less than 2 weeks, when controversy erupted due to a male contestant kissing a female contestant (on the cheek, or on the mouth the reports are conflicting). Bahrain, a minuscule kingdom off the coast of Saudi Arabia, had hoped to increase tourism revenues by hosting the MBC produced show, thus promoting the island. The European versions of Big Brother were considered scandalous in Europe, but the Arab version was conceived very innocently with no unnecessary encounters between male and female contestants, separate quarters to sleep and spend time in, and a very conservative dress code for the girls. However, the fatal kiss drew so much negative comments that it was promptly taken off the air. Critics comment though, that had the show been filmed in Lebanon, it would not have been canceled…

Some shows tried to formulas that would be acceptable in terms of values portrayed: Al Hawa Sawa invited 8 women to compete for the “best bride” title, the winner of which chose one of 6000 grooms who sent marriage proposals by video, all this under the watchful eyes of the girls’ mothers. The show claimed to promote marriage and obedience to the parents, two important values in the Arab world. In Dubai, Green Light is a reality TV show for Islamic charity, where contestants have to accomplish charitable missions, without a budget, on a tight deadline. In Tunisia, advertising and production giant Karaoui & Karaoui created Star Academy Maghreb, but it was unable to draw enough viewers away from LBC.

Conclusion

Reality TV shows have definitely impacted life in the Arab world, although opinions vary on how beneficial the effect really is. It will be interesting to follow their development over time. Will they remain a success? Will they still challenge values? Will they still be condemned by clerics? Will they cause (more) political change? One thing is certain, if these shows are discontinued, it will not be because the producers felt it was necessary. On the contrary, they love this format, which is cheaper to produce – minimal appearance of stars. If these shows do decline in ratings, this will confirm the pronounced influences of politics and religion on culture in the Arab world.

Bibliography

Ayish, Muhammad. "Reality TV is good for Arab democracy" The Daily Star March 16, 2009. March 20, 2009. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=100096>

Farah, Samar. "Can reality TV 'survive' in the Middle East?" The Christian Science Monitor March 26, 2004. March 17, 2009. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0326/p13s02-altv.html>

Karam, Imad. "Satellite Television: A Breathing Space for Arab Youth?" Arab Media and Political Renewal. Ed. Naomi Sakr. London. I.B.Tauris, 2007. 80-95

Khalil, Joe F. "Inside Arab Reality Television: Development, Definitions and Demystification". Transnational Broadcasting Studies 15, 2005. March 15, 2009. <http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall05/Khalil.html>

Khatib, Lina. "Language, Nationalism and Power: The Case of Reality Television in the Arab World" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sheraton New York, New York City, NY, - date unavailable - All Academic March 17, 2009. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p12542_index.html>

Kraidy, Marwan. "Idioms of Contention: Star Academy in Lebanon and Kuwait Arab Media and Political Renewal. Ed. Naomi Sakr. London. I.B.Tauris, 2007. 44-55

Kraidy, Marwan. "Hypermedia and governance in Saudi Arabia". First Monday special issue number 7, September 2006. March 18, 2009. <http://firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/kraidy/index.html>

Kraidy, Marwan. "Popular Culture as a Political Barometer: Lebanese-Syrian Relations and Superstar". Transnational Broadcasting Studies 16, 2006. March 20, 2009 <http://www.tbsjournal.com/Kraidy.html>

Kraidy, Marwan. "Reality Television and Politics in the Arab World: Preliminary Observations". Transnational Broadcasting Studies 15, 2005. March 16, 2009. <http://www.arabmediasociety.com/topics/index.php?t_article=85&p=2>

Kraidy, Marwan. "Reality TV, Nationalism, and Gender: Superstar and the Lebanon-Syria Media War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, TBA, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 21, 2008 All Academic March 17, 2009. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p230466_index.html>

MacFarquhar, Neil. "A Kiss Is Not Just a Kiss to an Angry Arab TV Audience" The New York Times March 5, 2004. March 19, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/world/a-kiss-is-not-just-a-kiss-to-an-angry-arab-tv-audience.html>

O’Carroll, Lisa. "Arab reality show jilted by runaway bride". The Guardian March 1, 2005. March 17, 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mar/01/race.broadcasting>

Weiner, Eric. "Green Lights: Arab Reality TV for Islamic Charity”. Day to Day September 2005, NPR 2009-02-05 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4929121>

Whitaker, Brian. "The value of trash TV" The Guardian May 22, 2007. March 17, 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/may/22/thevalueoftrashtv>

"Arabic language reality TV showing growth". AME Info June 03, 2008. March 20, 2009. <http://www.ameinfo.com/159266.html>

Raid Gaza - the game

2009-03-05T21:49:00.000-08:00

Raid Gaza

Click here to play this game

I just received this via the ArabNY list-serve. I'm not sure who designed the game. Would be very curious to find out.

Political Campaigns in Lebanon cont'd

2009-02-09T12:46:00.000-08:00

As the 4th annual commemoration of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq el Hariri approaches, a new advertising has been broadcast in Lebanon. It's the rallying cry of the March14 coalition, for supporters to hit the streets. It is especially significant with the ever approaching International Tribunal and the related investigation, which is what the last frame mentions in Arabic.
This is the truth, the video starts. (The March14 camp have been calling for revealing the truth since day one, understandably.)

However, this is also the truth. The ad is another disappointing example, for this ex-advertising person, of blatant plagiarism. Find below the TBWA-Argentina ad which won a Silver Cannes Lion (one of the most prestigious advertising awards) in 2006. Ironically also entitled Truth. This is especially distressing as the Lebanese advertising community tends to consider itself as highly (or more) creative and innovative (than anyone else in the region). I wonder if it's not a reflection of the politics of the country as well, namely, looking and borrowing from abroad (for) solutions of internal problems.

Sock and Awe and others...

2008-12-16T18:33:00.000-08:00

And to follow up on that last post, here's an online game that has been developed within less than a week, based on the now famous Iraqi news conference...
www.sockandawe.com (a pun on the "shock and awe" strategy of the American Military in Iraq), is a simple game where one has to aim and throw a shoe at a president Bush figure who keeps popping from behind a lectern. News worthy events also become entertainment worthy events.
The same thing occurred in 2006, at the end of the Football World Cup (read Soccer), after French player (and team captain) Zinedine Zidane head-butted Italian defence player Materazzi. http://www.aceviper.net/zidane.php The very next day the game had been very basically designed and made available on the net. (Note that there is now a more difficult version of the game, Zidane 2.0 of sorts also available at the link above). In the case of the World Cup, a couple of (very frustrated) French supporters decided to make the best out of a bad situation, and recorded a spoof song, with tongue-in-cheek lyrics, which became an official "hit" on the radio and online within a week of its first release online. The song, Coup de Boule [HeadButt], can be found on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWAJhUNj8Xg&feature=related.

I wonder whether these two incidents were so quickly caught and adapted, because they involved violence, and I mean in terms of why the games online where developed. Either way, as far as popularity contests go, Al Zairdi has a growing fanbase on facebook, including four groups, which describe him as Hero. (One of them also demands his release from police custody).

Bush gets the shoe(s) - mini rant

2008-12-15T11:21:00.001-08:00

It's funny how much noise that particular video has made. I can think of at least half my facebook acquaintances who have either posted it, or commented on it. (My brother's status is he's donating shoes for the cause). A lot of people have found it amusing, and a lot of people have wished he'd not missed, and a lot of people even felt vindicated. But my issue with this is not in the fact itself, but in the reporting of it, namely, the inclusion in every report on Western media of the sentence explaining that the (sole of a) shoe is a highest insult in the Arab world. Did that really need to be explained? Do people in Europe and America throw shoes at each other as signs of affection?

The Listening Post: Media Freedom across the world

2008-12-13T13:51:00.000-08:00

Listening Post is the media watch program on Al-Jazeera English. This report (from Nov 14) examines media freedoms across the world, based on the annual report of Reporters Without Border.

Part 1

Part 2

Arab Money: Busta Rhymes

2008-12-13T10:51:00.000-08:00

Busta Rhymes on www.hiphopdx.com (Oct 2, 2008):
"It's called 'Arab Money.'...'Take the Money' or 'Arab Money'," he said before speaking on his interpretation of the song. "Sometimes, people like to twist things. We ain't mockin' the culture. we ain't tryin' to be disrespectful. Ain't no racism going on right here. If you listen to the song, you see that we are actually acknowledging the fact that the Arabian culture, a middle East culture is one of the few cultures, that value passing down hard work riches that's been built amongst the family."
"It would be nice if a lot of other cultures did the same thing. Feel me? So, I would like for it to be like that in my culture where we could build things to the point where we got so much that we don't need to rely on other cultures to contribute majorly in a financial way, or in whatever other way, to societies, communities or whatever governments we might live in. So, we are actually biggin' up the culture. At the end of the day, I want to be like that. I think a lot of us want to be like that."

Literature Review

2008-12-12T23:12:00.000-08:00

Introduction
At a time of great tension between the Arab world and the West, this paper explores the impact of Arab news media and assess its possibility of bridging the existing cultural, political divide, as well as contributing objectively to the global public sphere. The issue is wide-ranging, and many areas demand great attention. This review sketches a preliminary draft of various areas of relevance in regard to the afore-mentioned topic. Western (and more specifically American) perceptions of the Arab world are very tightly linked to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, backwardness, totalitarianism, and lack of democracy, as witnessed in many products of (US) popular culture, news coverage and even foreign policy decisions. However, the development of new media, whether the Internet or satellite broadcasting, has provided the Arab world at large with the opportunity and the tools to start a conversation, an exchange of ideas and meanings with the West. During times of conflict, (and the Arab world is always in the throes of one war or the other) news media are at the forefront, creating and disseminating meaning, not only to the region, but also to the world (and arguably to the global public sphere) and as such, are a prime subject for analysis. This review begins with the concept of public sphere, and attempts to chart issues raised, especially in its relation to the state, democracy and media. The review then moves on to Al-Jazeera, and its perception in the Western world. Finally the review covers opinions in the possibility of Arab satellite media helping in the transition to democracy, and the opportunities it might provide to advance more developed political exchange with the West. While this paper identifies and explores some of issues, its scope only allows for an initial inquiry. Many areas need to be more exhaustively researched. This research is also the springboard for a search for new angles by which to approach the desperately needed dialogue between the Arab Middle East and the West.

The Public Sphere
Habermas introduced his concept of public sphere as a place where private individuals meet to discuss matters of public importance, a place of deliberation and discourse, where a consensus could be reached, in order to then influence the state in its policy making. Habermas envisioned the public sphere as the ideal democratic platform, accessible to all, disregarding status and favoring the merit of an argument, where any issue of public concern could be raised. The public sphere has been a favorite topic of debate recently, especially with the advent of new media such as the Internet, which is perceived to be the public sphere’s tool par excellence. Participatory media allows for people everywhere to participate in global discussions, more versatile voices are heard, via blogs, YouTube videos and others. The public sphere has become “global”. While this may be true, this also raises some interesting issues. One argument leveled at the model is that it presupposes the possibility of a consensus, and does not allow for a plurality of publics (Gitlin quoted in Taka 1982). This is especially relevant with the plurality of opinions online. Moreover, in faithful application of the Habermasian model, what is the global public sphere addressing? Which issues are of collective concern? Who are the “state(s)”? Are the citizens of the public sphere necessarily identifying with a nation-state or other entities? (Dahlgren 2002). These questions are especially relevant when pertaining to what is called the “Arab” public sphere. It is common practice to talk of an Arab public opinion, but is correct to assume that there is only one Arab opinion? The Arab world covers all countries from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, it includes monarchies and republics, with diverse religious constituencies, and different cultures. Although the main religion is Islam, majorities vary between countries in terms of sects, and other religions co-exist. Arabic is the main official language but exists in different dialects across the region, but communication (mediated or not) also occurs in English, Kurdish, Berber, French, Armenian, Spanish and Italian… (Iskandar 2007) Is it possible to lump then all these countries into one voice? Or are there multiple Arab spheres? Lynch suggests that a development of the notion of “Arab Street” (as it is often called by Western media and scholars) can be considered to be the Arab public sphere. The Arab Street is traditionally, the physical space, where active violent demonstrations occur, in resistance to imperial projects of the Western world. However, Lynch points to the Iraq wars and analyzes Arab reactions to a) the Invasion of Kuwait, b) the first Gulf war, c) the subsequent sanctioning of Iraq and d) the second (and on-going) Iraq war. He documents the changes from original opposition (of Saddam’s invasion, and support for Kuwait) to support of the Iraqi people (especially in terms of humanitarian crisis). This support was created via constant reporting by journalists and intellectual elite, during the decade between the two gulf wars, of the results of sanctions in newspapers and television. So an Arab public sphere does exist, but it defines itself via pan Arab issues (Iraq and Palestine), where all countries relate to a joint destiny against imperial (and Zionist) projects in the region (Iskandar 2007, Lynch 2003). The adoption of pan Arab issues as the main causes of public concerns in the Arab world has its roots in the fact that most Arabs have limited freedom to discuss domestic issues (political issues or social taboos) at home. The Arab world is known for a tight rein on journalism, which varies from outright censorship and political intimidation in some countries, to supervision in others. (Gher and Amin 1999, Iskandar 2007, Sakr 2001). Most political systems in the Arab world are less than democratic, if democratic at all. However Habermas’ public sphere notion is intrinsically and ideologically linked to democratic processes, and nation-building. Is the public sphere then a cause or a product of the transition to democracy? Traboulsi (2005) argues the essential universalism of the notion, which does not take into consideration other transitions in modes of government, as in the case of most the Arab world colonization to self-government (whether the ensuing rule is democratic or not). There is room to study the objective development of public spheres in the Arab world, whose first concern was not democracy per se, but a movement towards freedom and liberty and then social political organization and processes.

Global Objective News
While the Internet has been heralded as a more participatory tool in the global public sphere, its penetration in the Arab world is still minimal. On one hand, the threshold price for access is still too high for a big part of the population: studies have found that there are less than 18 computers for every 1000 persons (Sabry 2005). This and the high rate of illiteracy rate - literacy in general, but also the language barrier, as most websites are in English- have limited the potential of the Internet. It is important to note that many bloggers have made a name for themselves as citizen reporters. In the case of the Iraq War: Salam Pax’s Where is Raed? garnered much media attention. But it remains a fact that in order to be considered a “credible”, authoritarian source of reporting, the blogger still needs to achieve recognition by more traditional press and media. It is satellite media, however that has flourished in the Middle East since the 1990s, especially with the much heralded Al-Jazeera news channel, based in Qatar. It has been proclaimed to have single-handedly changed the face of news reporting in the Middle East, as a more credible news source than most censorship laden national news broadcasters, and offered new impetus to the afore-mentioned Arab global sphere. By offering the (positive) kind of press described in the Habermasian model. By far the most significant development in the recent news world history, Al-Jazeera has placed itself as the “other” voice of news, reporting from the side of the Arabs. Its slogan: The opinion and the other opinion make it clear that it wants to fight what it perceives to be an imperialist media, which CNN and BBC represent. However, it also offers the “other” alternative opinion inside the Arab world. It has consistently pitted rival factions within regimes against each other in interviews and talk shows, it has provided air space to dissident voices who otherwise would not be heard. It has also (and historically so) been the first Arab news media to conduct interviews with representatives of the state of Israel, in its efforts to ensure that both sides of every story be reported. Although it is perhaps too ambitious to call Al-Jazeera a truly global media, since Arabic is not the global language, and the content caters more to the Arab world, it is however global in stylization, programming and format (Sabry 2005). It certainly is transnational and has managed to reverse some of the uni-directional flow of information from the West to the East. Although respected in the Middle East as a credible source of alternative news and herald of Arab public opinion, Al-Jazeera has had much less success in the West. Its coverage is considered to be biased and slanted. The notion of objectivity in news reporting is slightly different than it is in philosophy. In news reporting, objectivity is another word for neutrality. Reporting the news objectively requires writing up the facts, with as little interpretation as possible, avoiding being influenced by exterior forces, avoiding ideological slants. By airing Ben Laden tapes, by showing “controversial” images of dead soldiers, Al-Jazeera has been condemned, in the US specifically as an “irresponsible” and “biased” channel (Johnson and Fahmy 2008). However, due to their presence in territory not covered by Western media, who relied on reports from “embedded reporters”, Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite broadcasters’ footage has been utilized in the West, especially in reporting civilian casualties. This meta-coverage only occupied around 6% of all news footage however (Johnson and Fahmy 2008) and can not be said to constitute a serious exchange, or chance for dialogue with the West as hyper-globalists contend, especially when considering the amount of “domestication” the footage receives when aired on other channels, with ensuing demonization of the channel. (Samuel-Azran 2007). [Contra-flow however is growing, especially when considering the development of one particular dynamic, namely the Arab diaspora across the world, whose reliance on Al-Jazeera and others for new from home increases the amount of penetration of Western markets. (Rai and Cottle 2007).]
Al-Jazeera’s Arabic station has been the object of great controversy, however what would be interesting at this point to study is the impact of Al-Jazeera English (AJE), the newly formed English station. AJE broadcasts from four different hubs: Kuala Lumpur, Doha, London and Washington DC, with a diversified staff from different parts of the world, and claims to cover more international news. How does Al-Jazeera English want to portray itself? Where does it place itself on the news map (in relation to Arab issues, global issues)? On the other hand, an analysis of the reception of AJE in the West could be enlightening as to the kind of communication breakdown the Arab World faces. Will AJE be able to bridge the gap, if it speaks exactly the same language as Western media, and even uses some of its former star reporters? Does the weight of Al-Jazeera Arabic prove to hard to bear? Does this pose ideological problems? Language problems? Cultural problems? Political problems?

The Role of the Journalist
Most modern studies about new Arab media focus on the pan-Arab, although there is a lot of literature about traditional press in the Arab world. This problem arises mainly from a lack of resources, a difficulty in conducting surveys and receiving straight answers in countries where censorship and government control are still strong. New satellite media however, are more open and have the advantage of trans-nationalism and have been very important in reviving a sense of “renewed pan-Arab” feeling. In this new pan-Arab field, Mellor raises important questions about what the role of the journalist should be. She suggests the interpretation of journalists as “cultural intermediaries” as opposed to the more classical view of journalists as “gatekeepers”, arguing that their position should be one of transition, in-between producing/constructing/selecting and interpreting/analyzing, reading public opinion while forming public opinion. She suggests more empirical studies be done about the role of journalists within their communities, how they identify it, what they think of using Modern Standard Arabic as opposed to vernacular Arabic-to relate more directly with their audiences, how they define their professional skills, how they deal with democracy-building , and how they perceive professional ethics in relation to their culture but also in comparison with foreign cultures and practices. (Mellor 2008). Can the journalist be even more engaged in political issues? Gilboa studies the active integration of journalism in the political realm, in what he calls “media-broker diplomacy”, and identifies three separate ways in which journalists have so far engaged in political activity: direct intervention, bridging and secret mediation. Journalists have been able to instigate talks between rival leaders, by transmitting information and messages, and advancing negotiations, offering the possibility for new mediation when all official channels were locked.According to his study, media-broker diplomacy has been successful six out of eight times, a high record in conflict resolution. However, this study only focuses on “star reporters”, such as Friedman, Seale, Koppel and Cronkite, whose reputations were firmly established. It does not account for the potential of “regular” journalists in more ordinary situation to be part of mediation between conflicting parties. Also this debate raises the same questions as Mellor, as to what the real boundaries of journalism are, how journalism is defined, what are the ethical and professional consequences of such action, making the news instead of reporting it. Literature about the role of media in many conflict-resolution worldwide (South Africa and Apartheid and others…) will provide interesting further reading.

Conclusion
In mapping the literature about Arab media, its role in the Arab and global public sphere, the following points are the most salient: Literature about Al-Jazeera abounds. This literature places the network as both controversial and as the success story in the field of Arab media. However, this research deals explicitly with its Arabic channel. Al-Manar (the Hezbollah channel) has also been extensively covered, no doubt due to its controversial nature. A lot has been written in terms of objectivity in relation to the coverage of the two more important conflicts in the Arab world, namely the issue of Palestine and now Iraq. The role of media in other conflicts within the Arab world is less explored (of less concern?). The apparent absence of significant, thorough literature (at least in preliminary research) about more local media stands out. Many sources cite the lack of empirical studies within the Middle East, due to difficulties in obtaining data: statistics and surveys are difficult to conduct, numbers offered by governments and other institutions are often incomplete or misleading, and some studies have faced cultural obstacles. The consumption of news media in the Middle East, and the effect of the local media in news dissemination can be further studied, and the relationship of media to democracy-building, especially in the post-colonial region of the Middle East is one interesting angle to pursue. I think here especially in terms of Lebanese news media, which is especially active, and enjoys greater freedom of speech than other countries. In Lebanon specifically, the role of journalists as political actors is very developed, as many politicians were originally prominent journalists, and (tragically) in recent years, two prominent journalists have assassinated, while one escaped an assassination plot, thus testifying to the great importance and status of journalists in the political arena.

Bibliography

Al-Jadda, S. (2007, December 19). Does al-Jazeera belong in the USA?. USA Today, pp. 13A.
Dahlgren, P. (2002). In Search of the Talkative Public: Media, Deliberative Democracy and Civic Culture. Javnost - The Public, 9(3), 5-26.
Gher, Leo A., Amin, Hussein Y. (1999). New and old media access and ownership in the Arab world. International Communication Gazette, 61(1), 59.
Gilboa, E. (2005). Media-broker diplomacy: When journalists become mediators. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 22(2), 99-120.
Habermas, J., Lennox, S., & Lennox, F. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article (1964). New German Critique, (3), 49-55.
Iskandar, A. (2008). Lines in the sand: Problematizing arab media in the post-taxonomic era. Arab Media and Society.
Johnson, Thomas J., Fahmy, Shahira (2008). The CNN of the Arab World or a Shill for Terrorists?: How Support for Press Freedom and Political Ideology Predict Credibility of Al-Jazeera among its Audience. International Communication Gazette, 70, 338-360
Ku, A. S. (1998). Boundary politics in the public sphere: Openness, secrecy, and leak. Sociological Theory, 16(2), 172-192.
Kulynych, J. J. (1997). Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation. Polity, 30(2), 315-346.
Lynch, M. (2003). Beyond the arab street: Iraq and the arab public sphere. Politics & Society, 31(1), 55.
Andrew Stroehlein (2007, November 30). Al - jazeera : The new force in providing quality foreign news. The Age (Melbourne, Australia), 13.
Mellor, N. (2008). Arab journalists as cultural intermediaries. The International Journal of Press/politics, 13(4), 465-483.
Nisbet, E. (2007). Media, identity, and the salience of democracy in the arab public sphere. Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association, 1-36.
Oates, S., Owen, D. M., & Gibson, R. (2006). The internet and politics: Citizens, voters and activists. Abingdon, Oxfordshire : Routledge.
Rai, M., Cottle, S.(2007). Global mediations: On the changing ecology of satellite television news. Global Media and Communication , 3, 51
Sabry, T. (2005). What is ‘global’ about Arab media? Global Media and Communication, 1, 41 - 46.
Sakr, N. (2001). Satellite realms: Transnational television, globalization and the middle east. London: I.B.Tauris.
Samuel-Azran, T. (2007). Will Non-Western Networks Promote a "global Culture”?
Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition 2(2), 37-44
Traboulsi, F. (2005). Public spheres and urban space: A critical comparative approach. New Political Science, 27(4), 529-541.
Tuchman, G. (1972). Objectivity as strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. The American Journal of Sociology, 77(4), 660-679.
W. Preston Warren. (1978). Modes of objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39(1), 74-91.

Vancouver Film Students on Iran

2008-12-12T21:15:00.000-08:00

Iran: A nation of bloggers from Mr.Aaron on Vimeo.

Why I Left Advertising

2008-12-11T08:46:00.000-08:00

Here's a prime example of the work that I find totally revolting in advertising. This is the new BurgerKing campaign (and i thought subservient chicken was bad enough!). BurgerKing's new Whopper Virgins (copyright if you please) has already generated a lot of controversy, online, only a few days after its release.
www.whoppervirgins.com
The Whopper Virgins experiment claims having conducted real ethnological-like surveys in countries of the world where hamburgers are (happily?) not a staple of the local diet. Thailand, Romania, Greenland and Iceland are taste-test-sites for your traditional BurgerKing vs MacDonalds competition. Oddly, in the BurgerKing-conducted-survey, BurgerKing wins. Whatever. A lot of money was spent on this "documentary", even enlisting the talents of Stacy Peralta (Sundance Award winner in documentaries) in an attempt to legitimize the findings.
All I can say is that I find the ad to be in very bad taste. (Pun intended).
There is something deeply disturbing about plastic food ("culinary culture" in the ad) seeking authenticity among the "more primitive", "purer" societies. There is something very colonial to ethnic groups being portrayed wearing traditional outfits. Something annoying about a documentary that claims to be real (no actors were used - making sure that the product standards "adhere to claim-substantiation rules"), but can't bother to get the names of the people they casually thank: The guy who lent his horse and carriage in Romania, the guy who gave Kevin a coat (no geographical referrent here altogether).
If one reads the comments of readers, I seem to be over-reacting. This ad is not offensive, on the contrary it's creative, I should chill, it's just about a burger. Sigh.

For more pro and con random ranting:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cathy-erway/burger-king-ads-underscor_b_150021.html
http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/12/09/whopper-virgins-ads-and-controversy-break/
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/organgrinder/2008/dec/04/advertising-food
http://adage.com/article?article_id=132979

UMS Class: Musings on the Monitorial Citizen

2008-12-11T07:15:00.000-08:00

One of my experiences with monitorial citizenship was during the war on Lebanon conducted by Israel, upon the kidnapping of 2 Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah, in July 2006. Though kidnapping Israeli soldiers was not a new tactic of Hizbullah, Israel decided to launch a full scale attack in response. The war lasted 34 days, during which Israel's ground and air assaults caused major damage to infrastructure, almost complete destruction of borderline villages, a vast oil spill, the destruction of a whole residential neighborhood in the suburbs of Beirut, which is known to be Hizbullah territory... and casualties in Lebanon included (the numbers are still being contested) around 1200 dead, around 4400 wounded and/or incapacitated, and one million Lebanese from the South displaced, (an additional 200,000 fled the country)...

Internationally, (and politically), reception was at best luke-warm, and many countries' initial reaction was to condemn Hizbullah's act (kidnapping the soldiers and firing missiles into Israel), and asserted Israel's right to self-defense (in its own War against Terror). Many Lebanese (me included) were at their wit's end, as to how the most international media (and some local ones) had decided that the conflict was categorized as a war between Israel and Hizbullah, as opposed to Israel attacking Lebanon. The whole country was under attack, and for a long while little to no effort was made to get a ceasefire. The news focused on Hizbullah, yet the whole country was under siege, with the airport closed (bombed on the first night), and Israeli ships patrolling territorial waters, forbidding ships from leaving or entering the country.

During that time, I worked as a volunteer (at Al Huda foundation) distributing food and hygiene products to the displaced who had not found room in public schools (the latter were cared for by government bodies). I also blogged incessantly, on friends' blogs, and on many websites I was a member of. Although most of the networks included Lebanese and Arabs abroad, a few were totally unrelated, for example a prominent British writer's fan website. I provided a bi-weekly diary of sorts, describing the news, my work, offering pictures, details, analysis, translations, etc...
When I posted the NGO's website for donations, many (virtual) friends donated (real) money. One of my blog contributions made it in to a book, [A Lost Summer: Postcards from Lebanon, Saqi Books, September 2008] (Sample pages shown below). A concert in the UK (left) took place where Lebanese and Arab artists performed, and read from the blogs collected in the book, the money going to Al Huda and Muwatinun and other NGOs. Also a few friends with a camera, and a studio not far from the main targeted area of Dahieh, recorded from Beirut... to those who love us. This video was sent through a number of channels, and networks and even ended up projected in Washington Square Park in NY, creating more public awareness. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article5524.shtml

Can I safely say that I believe in the power of monitorial citizenship? Micheal in another post [online class discussion] argues the nuance between power and information. Perhaps information (knowledge) is power. However, how powerful IS the dissemination of knowledge? When people know, can they change anything? I believe that my friends' contribution and mine were necessary, were an expression of our right and duty towards our fellow citizens, who could not be heard, who did not have access. Did we change the outcome of the war? I doubt it. It certainly helped us deal with some of its consequences, and its mis-perceptions.

I am not by nature a pessimist, but I am a realist. I believe monitorial citizenship is necessary. But the fact remains that while monitorial citizenship has allowed us to glimpse what is happening in Myanmar (eg) it has yet to change the situation of the Burmese people. When ENOUGH people know perhaps... But know what? I can think of a few issues I have with the amount of information offered on the web. There is an equal amount of "misinformation". The utopic dream the internet as a truely democratic tool, will it always bring on "better" things? Which versions of "truth" prevail? What informational standards are applied? How do you educate people to distinguish between a credible website and a non-credible one? What is a credible website, what is not?

The advantage of wikis is that they can always be edited, expanded, fine-tuned. The problem with wikis is that they can always be edited, censored.

Political Campaigns in Lebanon: I Love Life

2008-12-10T19:32:00.000-08:00

At a time when Lebanon seems to be at the brink of another civil war, and where political propaganda is at a new high, this essay’s purpose is to analyze one of the first mass media campaigns generated in Lebanon, following the death of prime Minister Rafic El Hariri, and study its impacts on the Lebanese public. The I LOVE LIFE campaign was one of the first mass branding campaigns. It sought to bring together various factions of the Lebanese population and was subsequently revisited, up until the present moment, which remains, of course, a delicate one.

Context
When former Lebanese prime minister Rafic El Hariri was brutally assassinated on Valentine’s day in 2005, in a huge blast that also claimed the life of 19 other civilians, people took to the streets, in one of the biggest demonstrations of grief and outrage that the country had witnessed in years. The country felt swept back into an era it had hoped it had surpassed, an era of summary execution of its various leaders, one which had plagued it throughout its long civil war. People rallied.

The death of prime minister Hariri eventually brought to light the depth of the rift in the fabric of Lebanese society. His followers marched in millions to demonstrate against Syria, whom they blamed for his assassination, it was the Cedar Revolution. They went down to the streets one month after Hariri's death, on the 14th of March 2005, to chant their anger and allegiance to the leaders of various political parties, who had banded together to form what is now familiarly called the March 14 alliance. This large demonstration which captured the lens of many international media, was also a response to the equally large protest which took place only a few days earlier and in the same district of the city, that of the (now called) March 8th movement, which brought together the opposing political parties in the country, an alliance which is spearheaded by Hizbullah (or the Party of God). March 8th followers declared their respect and thanks for and (to a certain degree) allegiance to Syria, which had not wrought upon them throughout the long trials and tribulations of the civil war, as much damage as the other archenemy, Israel. And so it started, the opposition of 8 and 14.

In order to keep the masses engaged, March14 relied on a group of advertising executives and “creatives” to create a campaign that would encompass the different groups that formed it. March 14 is an amalgam of the Future movement (Hariri’s party which has a large constituency of Lebanese Sunnis), the Lebanese Forces and the Phalanx party (Maronite Christians). Other smaller parties were also part of the movement. And so when the time came to find a rallying cry, the advertising consortium that was formed, deliberated and came up with the slogan: I LOVE LIFE.

At first glance, the slogan sounds more like a soft drink tagline than a political statement. This might be due to the fact that the makers of the campaign included people whose backgrounds were all advertising agencies and had worked mainly on consumer products. However the real reason for the choice of “I LOVE LIFE”, and as stated in their website (www.lebanon-ilovelife.com), is that it created a bloc opposed to March8 generally, but more specifically Hizbullah. Although Hizbullah had been integrated into the Lebanese government with elected representatives, it was still widely regarded as a renegade group. It’s a party that still holds arms, it’s a party that still wages war on behalf of the country, it’s even a party that is considered by the US government as a terrorist organization. As such it represents a threat to life. Hizbullah fighters are known to conduct suicide missions. The martyrs are then praised, because they have accessed Heaven through its widest golden gates. As such, they are said to have a cult of death. The best answer to that on the March14 side was to celebrate life.

The advantage of the I LOVE LIFE campaign was that it avoided a more specific political agenda. Remember that Lebanon had suffered through thirty years of civil war (among others). The parties constituting the March14 coalition had been at bitter odds against each other, and had inflicted countless casualties upon one another in earlier days. It would have been very difficult to come up with a slogan that could have been more specific politically, since the parties, who although they agree on the horror of Hariri’s execution, and its subsequent damage, might not necessarily agree on the means to achieve their aims. The I LOVE LIFE campaign also avoided any religious connotation, because the constituents of the greater March 14th alliance came from different religious backgrounds. The slogan was non-sectarian, thus more liberal, more open. In ignoring the details of the how and why and focusing their communication on the “other”, March 14 was more effectively united.

The Lebanese people are no strangers to political propaganda. During thirty long years, bitter words were exchanged between warring leaders, and were brought to the public via the available media at the time, namely television radio and newspapers. Lebanon, a relatively small country in size, boasts a fair number of stations, and it is safe to say that each station is affiliated to a particular party. The Lebanese recall quite well an era when Television Station 1 created little parodies about Leader 2, and Television Station 2 criticized Leader 1. On the radio, songs were performed by artists belonging to one party or the other, glorifying its beliefs and credo. So what was new this time around?

Politics as consumer product
Historically, in Lebanon (as elsewhere in the world), political posters and songs were created by artists either belonging to the party or having some affinity to it. However, the I LOVE LIFE campaign was not an impulsive/natural need of one or more artists to express themselves, or relay to the public the thoughts of March 14th. The I LOVE LIFE campaign was thought out by a group of advertisers and PR specialists, who had received (as for any other consumer brand) a brief, which had its budget, its target audience, its various media to be exploited. The I LOVE LIFE campaign was treated as a product campaign, to an extent that was never before seen in Lebanon. The brand was Lebanon. All advertising is about creating an image, a character for a brand, and in this case it was Lebanon as it wanted to be portrayed to the world, a life-loving, open, liberal country. A country that is known across the region for its higher education institutions, freedom of speech, sense of fashion, high-end services, and excellent entertainment and night-life. A country where all Arab nationals come to party, a country that is more westernized than any other in the Arab world. A country which westerners visit and fall in love with.

In terms of design, the I LOVE LIFE campaign adopted a familiar design, which also reinforced the more westernized image of March 14th - and suggested their pro-westernism - namely the use of a heart instead of the word love, instantly calling to mind I (HEART) NY. (Daniel Drennan writes in Electronic Intifada on December 7, 2007, that the campaign was actually funded by USAID - http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6474.shtml.)

The main visual for the campaign was therefore I (HEART) LIFE, written in a simple Sans Serif font (Impact), in white bold capital letters, set on a red background, with a small green leaf representing life and growth, on top of the heart. The campaign was produced in three different languages (Arabic, French, and English), which are interchangeably used when Lebanese people communicate with each other. The font in the Arabic visual also used a modern font, (AxtMarwan) and incorporated the heart. The campaign was launched at a first stage through billboards that were posted across the country, flooding the streets with red, white and green, which incidentally are the colors of the Lebanese flag. On billboards, on buildings, everywhere, I (HEART) LIFE was proclaimed. March 14th did not even need to sign the visual or claim it. No logo was incorporated into the design.

Such a campaign is not unusual. Countries all over the world create campaigns glorifying themselves, as seen on international media (Malaysia, truly Asia…). However these promotions are usually commissioned by ministry of Tourism, to sell the country to foreigners who might want to visit it. Rarely do such promotions target the people of the country itself. In this case, March14 was selling Lebanon to the Lebanese. It also sold it, with what is termed in advertising speak as “lifestyle” ads: ads that give an impression of the lifestyle of the brand, without specifying a core advantage per se, or selling a specific product. As, such, the campaign also differed from other political campaigns in the fact that it contained no call to action. In their book Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman and Richard A. Brody offer the following definition of politics: “Politics, at its core, is about persuasion. It hinges not just on whether citizens at any one moment in time tend to favor one side over another, but on the numbers of them that can be brought, when push comes to shove, from one side to the other or indeed, induced to leave the sidelines in order to take a side.”

On television, prominent personalities were enlisted to advertise why they "loved life in Lebanon", not unlike star endorsements of regular consumer products. Guy Manoukian (Lebanese musician/songwriter) seen in this clip: http://tinyurl.com/6277g9 explains that he loves life, because he is lebanese, because life inspires him, and allows him to write more sincere music. He then hints back to "the others" (and their "cult of death") by saying he wants to work, and live in Lebanon, he evens wants to die in Lebanon, but not just yet. The series of clips adopt a very simple format, The I (HEART) LIFE visual in the back, with speakers in front. The personalities chosen, reflect various political and sectarian directions. (More videos here: http://tinyurl.com/6lswh7, http://tinyurl.com/5otebs)

The I (HEART) LIFE campaign however, did not ask people to vote, to donate money, or even to get politically engaged. Instead, it provided them with a political fashion statement, so to speak. It gave them a slogan that they could use ubiquitously, without doing anything else. Soon, stickers were distributed all over the city and people everywhere used them, on their cars, attached them to their mobile phones, on walls, on notebooks, on purses. T-shirts were printed and distributed.

When Christmas approached, I (HEART) LIFE trees were decorated and placed throughout the country on main city roads. Musicians were invited to perform in trendy pubs and restaurants, and were kindly requested to repeat the slogan (I love life) in between songs performed. The main event of the campaign was a new year’s party, in one of Beirut’s newest and largest halls, featuring a plethora of Lebanese and foreign artists.
I (HEART) LIFE was indeed everywhere, a recognizable visual, for a recognizable “party”.

It is interesting to point out that the campaign was picked up by many. Whether this is proof of its success or not is debatable, but it was certainly testimony to its having become a familiar visual and theme. Indeed, after a few months of I (HEART) LIFE, no less than 5 brands started ad campaigns, which stated: “I love Carpets”, “I love life - with Diamonds”, “I love chicken turkey”…!

The opposition
The campaign was widely adopted, but the most interesting use of it was the reply by March8. The March8 spoof version of the I (HEART) LIFE campaign was meant as criticism of both the campaign and of March14. In a very simple tactic, using one's words against him, March8 transformed the campaign to highlight what they construed to be March14’s more superficial enjoyment of life. By adding each time one or two simple words, (as if tagged with white spray paint, thus appearing more underground, more sincere) March8 claimed their higher values: The posters became: I love life- in peace, I love life-in dignity, I love life-undictated. The campaign, by appropriating the I Love Life slogan to its own purposes, also tries to dispel the image that was being denounced by the original: that March8 have a cult of death. The March 8 campaign, was signed however by a Rainbow (representing the different factions of the alliance and their respective colours) and the words : Lebanese Opposition.

For more pictures (and political comments):
http://tinyurl.com/56vdg8
http://mideast.blogs.time.com/2007/01/17/poster_politics/
http://mideast.blogs.time.com/2007/02/18/loving_life_in_lebanon/

Art as Resistance: Lebanon

2008-12-09T22:08:00.000-08:00

Who said politics are all about long boring speeches? Graffiti in Lebanon is engaged, mostly politically, but increasingly socially as well. (A prominent stencil "campaign" through the streets of Beirut, last year spoke of the taboo -read illegal- subject of homosexuality).
Traditionally, people scribbled basic phrases of allegiance to this or that party along with the icon/logo thereof. However, graphic artists have recently been at work transforming the streets, expressing undying faith in ever struggling, ever-surviving Beirut (Beirut will not die) but also increasing weariness towards the political status-quo. The image to the left (taken from Leb Graffiti) shows people literally pulling the plug on the television news (which invariably report nothing good.) More Beiruti graffiti pics can be found at http://lebgraffiti.blogspot.com/ and http://29letters.wordpress.com/ (under the heading of Lebanese graffiti for the latter).
Al-Jazeera English covered the work of a few Lebanese artists, and the report is available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLnn273QNwA

New Media and Participation

2008-12-09T20:55:00.000-08:00

All that talk about participative media, and the effect of the web on the last elections... Although I have no doubt about how effective the use of the internet was by Obama's campaign managers, I find that the over-excitement about public participation a bit naive. Elections are one thing (that only occur every four years), but continuous political participation requires a lot more of people, and a degree of commitment (and higher understanding) of their rights and duties. An article in the Washington Times is entitled: Obama's Web Presence Loses its Luster, and describes how viewership of Obama's YouTube channel, where president-elect Obama conducts "fireside chats" has now dipped by 50%. The tools of participation are not enough to guarantee the act of participation.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/09/obamas-web-presence-loses-its-luster/

Before the Literature Review

2008-12-09T04:11:00.000-08:00

Thought process (-ing). How things take shape in my head.

Abstract III: Naomi Sakr & Transnational Media in the Middle East

2008-12-09T00:09:00.000-08:00

Naomi Sakr addresses the proliferation of satellite television in the Middle East, assessing their effects within the broader concepts of globalization and democracy. Her study, which spans the Arab world from Morocco to the Gulf, focuses on the 1990s as the decade that saw the creation and development of satellite channels in the region. Sakr challenges the general assumption that satellite media, by transcending national borders, is capable of providing the impetus for more liberal political practices throughout the region. Indeed, the idea that satellite television is less prone than territorial television to censorship, as typical of government-controlled media are in the Middle East, is misleading. Sakr demonstrates that for the exception of Al-Jazeera, (whose controversial programming has made it a pariah of governments and many an advertiser) most satellite channels are still state-owned, or affiliated to powerful political parties, and thus content-controlled. In terms of globalization, Sakr states that the research is inconclusive: if globalization is meant as a single politico-economico-cultural ideology, the study reveals resulting cultures of resistance, and reorientation, as well as integration into a system. In terms of globalization’s potential to unify society, Sakr shows that although a bigger mass of people is reached, this group is divided in terms of program preferences. In subsequent chapters, and via elaborate research that draws on articles, books and conferences, covering fields as varied as media, sociology, politics, Arab history, popular culture, international law, NGOs, advertising and marketing, economics, international and regional policy-making, Sakr seeks to define the various forces at play in the satellite television scene. Her research shows that power, money and ideas in satellite media are still widely linked to the power structures in the political arena (ex: MBC-Saudi royal family, Future TV-Hariri family, Nile Channels-Egyptian government). Many stations perceive their role as intrinsically propagandist, showing the “good” side of Arab culture, to attract investors, and are tools for governments or politicians to resolve domestic issues, or devise (foreign) policy. Even NGOs, which could play a unifying role at civil society level by promoting freedom of expression and human rights, are mostly denied access to satellite presence, furthering the point that globalization via satellite media is yet to be achieved. As such, Sakr suggests that it is more accurate to describe satellite channels in the Arab World as ‘transnational’ rather than ‘global’. Although Sakr’s extensive research includes many statistics and numbers, she frequently points out that accurate quantitative studies are sorely lacking in the Middle East. Some arguments provided by Arab media experts, are actually merely educated guesses on their part to fill in gaps. The study would have surely contained these numbers, had they been available, but this also raises interesting questions as to whether these studies can ever be performed. Sakr’s work is very effective in defining the context in which satellite television developed in the Middle East and offers a very comprehensive introduction. Political events that have followed the publishing of this book have however greatly affected the media scene, and given birth to new news players (Al-Manar, Al Arabiyya), have given higher credibility to some (Al-Jazeera), and have changed the focus of others (Future Television). It would be interesting to compare and contrast the state of satellite media in the Arab world today, in its second decade of existence, to discover whether the great pace of change in both technology and politics have managed to achieve any perceptible differences at television level, and the development of a more truly global arena of communication.

Sakr, N. (2001). Satellite realms: Transnational television, globalization and the middle east. London: I.B.Tauris

Abstract II: Tuchman & Objectivity as Strategic Ritual

2008-12-08T23:58:00.000-08:00

In this article, Tuchman addresses the use of “objectivity” by newsmen as a “strategic ritual” to counter potential criticism from peers, superiors or the general public. Objectivity is understood by newsmen as “objective fact”, one that can be verified, and will not place the reporter (or his newspaper) in danger of a libel suit, loss of profit, or have either of them perceived as biased. Tuchman compares that notion with sociologists’ (Durkheim and Weber) definitions of what objectivity means conceptually, and draws on the work of Gouldner, Mills, Udry, Hughes and others, to illustrate various justifications of “objective” methodologies. With two years of ethnographic work, and armed with specific examples of objectivity problems, Tuchman elaborately describes regular procedures of newsmen, concentrating on three influencing factors, namely, the form of an article, its content and the knowledge a reporter has of inter-organizational relationships: “Objective fact” is achieved via stylistic approaches, such as presenting supplementary facts, or conflicting opinions, using quotations (as a means of distancing the reporter from the text), presenting most “material facts” first, separating news from opinion pieces in the actual paper, relying on news judgment or common sense. Tuchman questions these practices, whose results are often at odds with the sought aim of objectivity. He questions the relationship between these strategic rituals and the credibility of news reports, the interaction between said strategies and content, as well as other potential political and social significations, which he proposes should be further studied. The notion of newsmen’s objectivity being fully discussed, the essay could have been even more compelling had other more classical debates about objectivity (What does it mean? Is it possible?) been raised.

Tuchman, G. (1972). Objectivity as strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. The American Journal of Sociology, 77(4), 660-679.

Abstract I: Habermas and the Public Sphere

2008-12-08T23:53:00.000-08:00

In this encyclopedia entry, Habermas develops his concept of the public sphere and its critical role in society. He discusses the importance of communication media for expressing public opinion thus contributing to the formation of the public sphere, and later, its disintegration. The public sphere is defined as the space where private individuals can meet, to discuss freely and without constraints matters of the state, deemed as general interest, thus forming “public opinion” which is then duly published. With an elaborate historical review of feudal and monarchical systems, and via a Marxist perspective, Habermas seeks to disambiguate his particular notion of “public” vs “private”, as well as that of “opinion” and “representation”, to arrive at 18th century Europe, where the rise of a bourgeois society, vocal in its debate of political matters and the authority of the state, is the first instance of an active, critical public sphere. This model is analyzed in terms of structures and distribution of power among state and public sphere, where the latter controls and supervises, via the press. Habermas’ contribution is especially relevant in its historical context, and in its emphasis on informal social spaces as important promoters of liberal thinking and thus democracy. However, the study is limited to an elite educated bourgeoisie, and does not consider subsequent new social groups, which have gained new importance and presence in society. Instead, Habermas points to the transformation of critical journalism into capital-driven mass media in the modern consumer system, which creates confusion and eventually leads to a “refeudalization” of the public sphere. This, he says, can only be countered by a rational reorganization of social and political powers with a specific commitment to the principle of public sphere.

Habermas, J., Lennox, S., & Lennox, F. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article (1964). New German Critique, (3), 49-55.

Art as Resistance: Iraq

2008-12-08T23:38:00.000-08:00

Wafaa Bilal, an Iraqi artist currently assistant professor at Tisch (NYU). His work is very provocative and relevant in terms of dealing with/understanding/re-reading/re-interpreting war.
http://www.wafaabilal.com/

Intellectual Autobiography

2008-10-20T10:18:00.000-07:00

Communication. My first and foremost interest in life. Because of it, I learned to speak four languages. My undergraduate degree was in Graphic Design, or the field of visual communication. It was an exploration of a new medium, one that did not necessarily require words, as much as color, photography, illustration etc…
After my graduation in 1999, I pursued a career in commercial advertising, as art director and copywriter. During those years I developed strategies and techniques to sell a product, create an image, and pass on a message, whether through traditional print media such as posters and print ads, television and radio, but also for new ones such as the internet and other alternative ambient media. Designer Paul Rand once said: “If you can’t make it good, make it big. If you can’t make it big, make it red.” His point was that some ideas that are too difficult to be effectively transmitted in their elaborate complexity, can be put forth “loudly enough” if they are literally given more volume, or are strikingly underlined. Unfortunately, that is often the case in advertising, when in order to sell to the biggest number of consumers, advertisers tend to chose the smallest common denominator, and work a whole campaign from there. This is not to undermine the amount of research and thinking that goes into the initial processes of advertising campaigns, but it does however taint the result. The smallest common denominator is never nearly enough to convey a full message, or paint a whole picture. As a citizen of the Middle East, I have been acutely aware of the incomplete representation of the complexities of the region, whether culturally or politically, that has been afforded us. My own complex background - of (exiled) Palestinian and Jordanian descent, Lebanese, Christian, not a minority in my country - is always received with some astonishment in the West. What has been advertised of this forever turbulent part of the world is a jumble of big, red clichés. I feel compelled, as an able communicator, to change or, at least, readjust the misguided perception.

Political Media. The effect of local and international politics has been tremendous in the shaping of my character and interests. As a person who has lived in a war zone for the greater part of my life, I have been a constant and diligent consumer of news (see Timeline Mapping and News Sources attached). Each war or conflict brought with it a new media, which relayed the news to me. And although news stations claim factual reporting, it is a fact that different media sources will relate the same information differently. Marshall McLuhan said: “The medium is the message”. Nowhere is that more obvious than in the actual case of news media. Al-Jazeera and CNN are as much the message as the report they are broadcasting. They disseminate news, form opinions, offer perspectives, and they are also the message of their backers and funders’ agendas. The array of political news stations currently available offers an interesting interplay of forces. The media represent political trends and perspectives which are conflicting, even if they stem from the same region. Al-Jazeera is based in Qatar, and Qatar is currently playing a bigger political role than it used to in the region (the last bout of civil unrest in May in Lebanon was ended by a deal brokered by the Qatari government). This is a new development as the peace brokers were traditionally the Saudi Arabian government who have a lot of money invested in Lebanese real estate and companies. A lot of the credibility of Qatar stems from Al-Jazeera, and its soi-disant free press, and its fresh, progressive perspective. It is an interesting case study, because Qatar not unlike its Saudi neighbors, has great American military facilities on its land, and would generally be mistrusted by some of the parties involved. Yet its media was enough to create a shift in perception, at the level of the mass audience but also at the level of political leaders. The complex interplay between politics and media is why I applied for Media Studies at the New School. I intend to get a deeper understanding of the way political media work, and learn to approach them objectively and critically. My previous experience is very relevant, and I do have much to say about the matter, however, my first spontaneous reaction is always subjective. I need to be able to look at media workings from an academic, researched, perspective, one which is not solely based on my emotional appraisal (as an Arab, misrepresented, misconstrued, resisting, anti-westerner etc…).

Media in Conflict Resolution. Semiologist (political critic) Noam Chomsky has prefaced many a book of his with the anecdote that whenever he is asked to write an article or an essay about the region, the title “The Current Crisis in the Middle East” is always an apt one. Indeed, this is a region that has been ablaze with wars throughout my life. And what I can say about it, and to quote the famous Edwin Starr song, “War. What is it good for? Absolutely nothing.” As a person who believes in communication, I believe that we have reached a point in time and in civilized development where other mediums than arms should be used to resolve conflicts. People beings might be of different cultures, but that does not mean there should be total communication breakdown. We all value the same things, individual happiness, safety, health, love, music, only differently. I would like to take advantage of my time in the New School to learn more about how to engage in a conversation about differences and similarities, discuss war and peace, raise public awareness to social and political causes through media. I believe that by exploring how media works, how it is created, and why, I will be able to use it more effectively in solving what I find to be the most pressing causes worldwide, namely war, and abuse of basic human rights. Media (and here I mean film and documentaries) are also Art, and art is, or at least can be, a universal language, a universal communication tool. And artists as media experts, are even more adept at getting a message across. Some would argue against art being engaged. Art should be for art’s sake, as an experiment in heightening human consciousness and intellect. But I find that if human consciousness is still at the level of accepting and engaging in wars, then perhaps it is up to the artists to help change and shift perceptions.

Influences. I have always admired artists and writers who have broken a status quo, who have challenged perceptions, or offered radical new views, moved the conversation forward in their respective fields. In literature, Kurt Vonnegut Jr. wrote books that are essentially virulent critiques of war, yet in a style that is simple, (almost naïve), humorous, full of humanity and forgiveness, even supplemented with drawings and doodles. Surrealist writers in France (Breton, Eluard, Aragon) freed written prose from its rigid structure (punctuation for example), and promoted a more psychic intuitive connection between thoughts in their poetry. In art, Picasso chose to break down traditional perspective, one that was celebrated as Humanity’s “Renaissance”, to create Cubism. He offered multiple perspective at the same time, opening up the debate of the modern world, the camera, the speed, the need for new material, the immediacy, the instantaneity of art and opposed it to his use of traditional paint on canvas – his approach being all the more contrasting with the Impressionist movement which preceded his, as it was a very rational as opposed to emotional. In cartoons, Naji El Ali, Palestinian cartoonist narrated the Palestinian exile’s struggle and adventures, in simple and elegant black and white drawings, which transmitted all the nostalgia, confusion and defiance inherent in the Palestinian cause. (see http://www.najialali.com/ and http://www.handala.org/)
In film, Stanley Kubrick’s now iconic movies (A Clockwork Orange, 2001: A Space Odyssey and Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb) have been controversial, yet always engaging. Dr. Strangelove is a “comedy” about a nuclear holocaust, a very a-typical way of approaching a very hot theme in the 1960s. Kubrick deserves a more elaborate analysis, but suffice to say that he was very meticulous artist, who valued all the details of a film equally (colour, set design, sound design, music, he even created a camera lens to satisfy his lighting needs in Barry Lyndon) and who knew the intricacies of the how and why of his movies, and as such is a very inspiring film director. Documentaries had traditionally been thought of as dull as history lessons, but a new approach in documentary making has sparked renewed interest in them and their subject matters. Baraka (Ron Fricke), the Qatsi trilogy (Godfrey Reggio , and music by Phillip Glass) have revolutionized the meaning of documentary by making it a worthy art piece, as much as it offers documentation, criticism and analysis.
The above-mentioned artists have convinced me that it is possible to create messages that can be more interesting than dreary political debates, and that can slowly but surely drag the viewer into a conversation, one where he/she has not already taken sides. I am at this point inclined to pursue an academic research approach about news media, but I believe that I will, and should be also promoting peace and understanding and that through the making of films and documentaries, inspired by the artists I mentioned (and ones I am sure I forgot to). There is still a lot left unsaid in the issues of the Middle East, and I intend to find the best and most expressive way to do it and to bring about change.

Looking for directions

2008-10-02T23:27:00.000-07:00

I've started thinking about what I should narrow my research to. As a general rule, I know it will have to do with politics and media, however I am not sure if I am going to be watching the news, or creating some (by making documentaries). I have started building a list of resources (so far a few websites magazines and books) which will help me assess what has already been written, and what still needs to be discussed, developed, elaborated upon, filmed... Here is the first interesting find:

www.arabmediasociety.com

The Listening Post

2008-09-25T00:35:00.000-07:00

The Listening Post: a weekly programme on Al Jazera International which discusses how the media cover the news, throughout various platforms and all over the world.

There are two episodes that I found interesting/enlightening, which deal with my area of interest: Iran and the Media, and Conflict in Lebanon. But you can find a list of all their other episodes as well at the following address: http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/listeningpost/